
Recognizing MFA Fatigue: Why Push Notifications Aren't Just an Awareness Issue

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An unexpected MFA request initially seems like a minor nuisance. If many push notifications follow in rapid succession, it can turn into a security incident: attackers attempt to provoke an approval after having already obtained login credentials. This pattern is known as MFA fatigue, MFA bombing, or push bombing.
For CISOs, the crucial question is therefore not just whether employees reject a suspicious request. It must be examined why an attacker can trigger any number of requests, what signals the security team receives, and whether affected individuals can report the event immediately. MFA fatigue is an interplay of identity protection, configuration, detection, and human decision-making.
What actually happens technically during MFA fatigue
Multi-factor authentication remains an important layer of defense. However, MFA fatigue exploits a weakness in certain push methods: anyone who possesses a username and password can launch repeated login attempts. Each request generates a notification on the registered device. With a simple choice between "Approve" and "Deny", a single accidental confirmation is sufficient.
The current NIST guideline SP 800-63B explicitly classifies out-of-band authentication as not phishing-resistant. A method that merely asks for consent on a second channel is no longer considered sufficient there due to observed "authentication fatigue" attacks. NIST requires an active transmission of a secret between channels for this method and also recommends limiting the number or rate of push notifications since the last successful authentication.
This shifts the responsibility: an unexpected approval is not merely an error by a single person. If the process permits repeated requests, lacks context, or fails to trigger a rapid response, the technical design contributes to the risk.
Scattered Spider demonstrates the link between technology and social engineering
The extent to which MFA fatigue is linked to further attack steps is documented in the joint advisory on the Scattered Spider group, updated in 2025 by the FBI, CISA, and international partner agencies. The authorities describe repeated MFA pushes intended to induce employees to accept. At the same time, threat actors impersonated IT or helpdesk personnel, had passwords reset, or transferred MFA tokens to controlled devices.
This real-world case is relevant for security leaders because it demonstrates the limits of an isolated awareness message. "Do not confirm unknown requests" is correct, but it covers only part of the attack chain. If helpdesk processes inadequately verify an identity, MFA registrations are not monitored, or an unusual push storm fails to generate a signal, access remains vulnerable even with security-conscious employees.
Which controls CISOs should examine first
The most effective prioritization begins with the authentication method. Phishing-resistant cryptographic methods bind the authentication to the legitimate service and avoid simple push approvals. Where an immediate transition is not possible, number matching can make unintentional confirmation more difficult: the person logging in must enter a number displayed on the login screen into the authenticator app. Microsoft documents that number matching is mandatorily enabled for Microsoft Authenticator push notifications.
Nevertheless, number matching is not equivalent to phishing-resistant MFA. NIST clarifies that manually transferred authentication outputs are not bound to the specific session and therefore are not considered phishing-resistant. For the roadmap, this means: number matching can be a reasonable interim step, but it should not replace migration to suitable cryptographic methods for high-value accounts.
Five review questions help with the assessment:
• Which accounts and applications still use simple approve/deny pushes, SMS, or one-time codes?
• Are repeated MFA requests, unusual login locations, and changes to registered factors detected and correlated?
• Do the systems deployed limit the number or rate of triggered push requests?
• How is identity verified during password resets, factor changes, and helpdesk contact?
• Can employees escalate an unexpected request using a known, quickly accessible reporting channel?
These questions connect prevention and response. Rejecting a prompt on a smartphone ends the login attempt, but it does not eliminate the potentially compromised password. The reporting channel must therefore be able to trigger a technical investigation, the securing of the account, and the review of further login events.
Awareness must link the reporting channel with technology
Awareness has a precise role in MFA fatigue: employees must classify unexpected requests as a possible sign of compromised credentials and know the designated reporting channel. The message should align with the actual interface of the system in use, the helpdesk process, and the security team's response. General appeals for vigilance are not sufficient for this.
Measuring success should also capture more than training participation. For example, it is relevant whether suspicious requests are reported promptly, whether the report triggers the correct technical steps, and whether repeated push events can be detected in existing telemetry. These are organizational checkpoints; they do not yet constitute blanket proof of effectiveness for an individual training course.
In this context, the Security Awareness Platform from What The Hack! can serve as a component of a broader program. In a team format, employees discuss security scenarios and agree on an answer; the solo mode and selectable topic campaigns provide additional support for individual use. For technical contextualization regarding social engineering and reporting behavior, the page on Cybersecurity Awareness with What The Hack! offers a suitable next starting point. Technical hardening, identity processes, and incident response remain distinct tasks.
Conclusion: Evaluate push MFA as an entire system
MFA fatigue is not an argument against multi-factor authentication. It demonstrates that not every MFA method provides the same protection and that a security control is only resilient in conjunction with configuration, monitoring, and response.
For CISOs, a clear sequence emerges: identify simple push approvals, transition exposed accounts to phishing-resistant methods, harden and rate-limit remaining push methods, and establish a clear reporting and response path. Awareness supports this architecture by clarifying the significance of unexpected requests and the next steps. However, it cannot compensate for a vulnerable authentication configuration.
Sources and further information
• NIST: SP 800-63B – Authentication and Authenticator Management, current requirements and classification of out-of-band authentication, authentication fatigue, and phishing resistance.
• FBI, CISA, and international partner agencies: Scattered Spider – Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, Update from July 29, 2025, documented tactics on push bombing, helpdesk impersonation, and MFA manipulation.
• Microsoft Learn: How number matching works in MFA push notifications for Authenticator, functionality and deployment of number matching.

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