Reporting Phishing in Companies: Why the Report Button Is Just the Beginning

Suspicious emails, text messages, messenger messages, or phone calls are often first noticed by employees. This creates a valuable tip-off—but not yet an actionable security signal. A report button can simplify receipt. Whether this results in protection is determined by the process chain behind it: What information reaches whom, how is it prioritized, when is it escalated, and what feedback does the reporting person receive?

This question is by no means theoretical for companies. In an analysis published on September 30, 2026, ENISA reports that 74 percent of surveyed employees had received suspicious emails, text or voice messages, or links in the preceding six months. The underlying Eurobarometer survey explicitly examined the ability to identify and report, as well as existing rules and reporting channels.

For CISOs and awareness officers, this results in a clear task: It is not enough for the detection of suspicious content to work. The handover from the individual to the responsible security function also requires a resilient operating model.

A report button is an entry point, not a process

The UK National Cyber Security Centre describes phishing defense as an interplay of technical, organizational, and people-centric measures. A portion of attacks will pass technical filters; therefore, detection and reporting by employees are just as much a part of protection as a rapid response to incidents.

This classification prevents two typical misconceptions. First, awareness cannot guarantee that every deception will be recognized. Second, a report does not yet mean that the organization is able to respond. If a tip ends up in an unmonitored mailbox, critical context data is missing, or no one handles the escalation, the vigilance of the reporting person remains operationally untapped.

A viable reporting pathway must therefore not only be visible and easily accessible. It must be connected to triage, incident response, and the relevant business processes.

Six stages from suspicion to response

A six-stage chain helps when reviewing your own operating model. It does not prescribe a universal tooling blueprint, but rather the decisions an organization must bindingly make:

1. Intake: Employees need a simple, well-known route for email, SMS, messenger apps, phone, and other relevant channels. Access should also work if the affected device or account is no longer trustworthy.

2. Context: The report must provide sufficient information for an initial assessment. This can include the intake channel and timestamp, visible sender, requested action, and steps already taken. What information is required depends on the system landscape and risk.

3. Triage: A designated team evaluates whether the case involves spam, a known attack, potential account compromise, or an event requiring immediate action. Responsibility for this classification lies with Security, the Service Desk, or Incident Response—not with the reporting individual.

4. Escalation: Responsibilities and reachable communication channels must be established for critical reports. Entered credentials, installed software, or an initiated payment require a different response than an unopened message.

5. Feedback: The reporting individual should be promptly informed that the tip was received and what they should do until the situation is resolved. The NCSC recommends a clear, simple, and fast process along with prompt feedback on actions taken.

6. Feedback Loop: Confirmed patterns must feed into technical controls, warnings, process modifications, and the topic planning of awareness initiatives. Only then does a series of isolated tips turn into a learning security process.

The six stages make interfaces visible. Awareness explains when and how to report. The service desk can receive tips. SOC and Incident Response evaluate technical and organizational consequences. Business units decide on affected payments, data, or customer processes. Without a clear handoff, each function remains active on its own, but the response chain breaks.

The reporting pathway must reach all relevant channels

Many organizations start with email because a reporting function can be easily integrated technically. However, attacks deliberately pivot between channels. An SMS can lead to a spoofed login page, a phone call can prepare an approval, and a messenger message can impersonate an executive's identity.

The article Smishing in the Enterprise shows why mobile messages often fall outside the scope of email protection. For the central reporting process, this means: Decision-makers must define how reports from private or managed mobile devices arrive securely, what content may be transmitted, and which fallback route applies if the normal channel is compromised.

Channel coverage does not mean setting up a separate mailbox for every service. The deciding factor is a unified intake and triage logic. Employees need a few easy-to-understand pathways; internal processing must account for the specifics of the respective channel.

Feedback determines the reporting culture

The NCSC cautions against blaming employees for poor decisions. Those who fear penalties may report a click or data entry too late or not at all. However, information about what has already occurred is vital for the response.

A resilient reporting culture therefore separates technical evaluation from personal blame. Feedback should be specific enough to clarify the next step, yet concise enough not to overload triage. An automated confirmation of receipt can provide reassurance. In cases of potential impact, case-specific instructions and an accessible point of contact are also required.

Feedback also works both ways. Security learns which messages appear plausible or which legitimate communications are routinely flagged as suspicious. Employees learn that their reports are acted upon. This visible reaction reinforces their willingness to report uncertainty as well, rather than waiting for proof of an attack.

Interpreting metrics as process signals

A rising number of reports can be due to more attacks, heightened awareness, an easier reporting path, or a combination of these factors. On its own, it is neither a measure of risk nor proof of effectiveness.

The evaluation becomes more meaningful when decision-makers consider several process signals together: Which channels become visible? How much time elapses before the initial assessment? In what percentage are crucial details missing? How often are similar reports consolidated? And how quickly does an urgent report reach the responsible team?

The limitation described in the article Measuring Security Awareness regarding training data also applies here: Activity and participation are not to be equated with secure behavior or risk reduction. Reporting metrics help manage the process. Whether technical and organizational controls are truly effective must be examined separately.

Integrating What The Hack! into the reporting process

The What The Hack! security awareness platform offers team and solo use. In the team format, employees discuss security scenarios and agree on an answer. This allows different assessments to come to light, enabling leaders to reinforce their company's mandatory rules.

Game results and evaluations are available following sessions. They can provide pointers for topic prioritization, but they replace neither real reporting data nor the validation of triage and incident response. Product integration is therefore strongest when awareness and operations are planned together: The training format teaches the decision to report, while the organization provides the actual pathway, responsibility, and response.

Conclusion: Vigilance must become a response chain

Employees can serve as an effective early warning signal if their reports reach the right team quickly and without unnecessary hurdles. The report button facilitates the first step. Security value is created through context, triage, escalation, feedback, and feeding confirmed patterns back into controls and awareness.

For CISOs, the benchmark is therefore not the mere existence of a reporting channel. What matters is whether the entire chain functions under time pressure, covers diverse communication channels, and supports open reporting even after a click has occurred or data has already been entered.

Sources

• ENISA: Cybersecurity Month @ work – Employees’ skills under the looking glass

• ENISA: Cyber Incident Awareness

• UK National Cyber Security Centre: Phishing attacks – defending your organisation